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Since the September 11th attacks on the World Trade
Center, high profile terrorist attacks have repeatedly
occurred around the world and have frequently been
identified as an “Islamic problem” (see,  for example,
Silke 2015). Poland is a potential environment for ter-
rorist activities. As a member of the European Union
and NATO, Poland is obligated to cooperate with ser-
vices from allied countries to ensure public safety. 
An effective terrorism prevention program requires
an understanding of the psychological factors under-
lying  pro-terrorist  attitudes.  The  fundamental  ques-
tion in gaining that understanding is: why do some
people become radicalized and accepting of terrorism?
The  numerous  studies  in  this  field  have  not  yet
reached a consensus, and knowledge of the psycho-
logical mechanisms that underlie the process of radi-
calization remain scarce. This study aims to contrib-
ute to resolving this question by taking into consider-
ation psychological and socio-cultural factors (the so-
cio-cultural factors were treated as control variables
and are described in section 3.1. Participants). Exam-
ining these factors may be helpful in creating psycho-
logical counterterrorism programs directed at chang-
ing pro-terrorist  beliefs and providing social policies
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1 The Concept of Radicalization: Attitudes 
Toward Non-Sacrifice and Sacrifice Terrorism
The meaning of the term radicalization is ambiguous
and unclear (Della Porta and LaFree 2012; Neumann
2013). In a broader sense, radicalization is defined as a
process that leads a person to become an extremist.
The term extremism – in the context of liberal democ-
racy – refers to the acceptance of an ideology and/or
behaviors  that  reject  democratic  values  and human
rights (Jakubowska 2005;  Neumann 2013).  Thus, the
process of radicalization refers to attitudes and/or be-
haviors (Della Porta and LaFree 2012). In a narrower
sense, the term is used to describe the process of be-
coming a terrorist (Milla, Putra, and Umam 2018; We-
ber and Kruglanski 2018). We will focus on this latter
aspect of radicalization. 
Most theoretical models of radicalization describe it
in multiple dimensions. Supporting violent extremism
in political struggle is, according to this point of view,
the  lowest,  most  passive  degree  of  radicalization,
while the highest is engagement in violence (King and
Taylor 2011;  Kruglanski  et  al.  2014;  McCauley 2012;
McGinley  2010;  Milla,  Putra,  and  Umam  2018;
Zhirkov,  Verkuyten,  and Weesie  2014).  For  the pur-
poses of this paper, radicalization will refer to a posi-
tive attitude toward terrorism that may interchange-
ably  be named acceptance,  approval,  or  support  for
terrorism. Of course,  this  does not mean that every
supporter of terrorism will become a terrorist (Della
Porta and LaFree 2012; Ginges et al. 2011; Kruglanski
et al. 2014). It requires a specific configuration of per-
sonal, cultural, and situational factors to push individ-
uals  toward  terrorist  activities  (Ginges  et  al.  2011;
Kruglanski et al. 2014; Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglanski
2017). However, even the most passive support for ter-
rorism is a risk factor for terrorist attacks. Widespread
community support for terrorism implies the social le-
gitimization of extreme violence, which can encourage
engagement  in  terrorist  actions  (Jasko,  LaFree,  and
Kruglanski 2017; Paul 2010; Lygre and Eid 2012). 
The traditional research approach to radicalization
is  based  on  understanding  terrorism as  a  homoge-
neous  phenomenon.  This  theoretical  perspective  is
justified by using violence in all terrorist acts, regard-
less of their form. However, this approach may be a
source of many contradictions in theoretical explana-
tions of radicalization. In fact, we can distinguish two
basic forms of terrorism. These are non-sacrifice and
sacrifice terrorism (Ginges et al. 2011; Marone 2013).
These forms of terrorism differ in their dominant mo-
tives,  victims,  and methods of attacks.  Non-sacrifice
terrorism is motivated by a willingness to kill enemies;
the motive of destruction dominates (Marone 2013).
The methods of  violence are very diverse,  including
hostage-taking, political assassination, bombing, etc. 
Sacrifice terrorism means suicide terrorism, usually
in the form of  suicide bombing (Ginges et  al.  2011;
Marone 2013). In this case, the death of potential vic-
tims is  simultaneously connected with the expected
death of a bombing’s perpetrator(s). In other words,
sacrifice terrorism is motivated by both a willingness
to kill and a desire for martyrdom (Marone 2013). Sui-
cide  terrorists  sacrifice  their  own  lives  for  political
goals, overriding their self-preservation instincts and
faith imperatives (Lankford 2010; Marone 2013; Silke
2015). It is for this reason that terrorist ideology glori-
fies suicide terrorists as heroes who have given their
lives in service of  the Islamic community,  and their
deaths  are  attributed  deep  religious  meaning
(Kruglanski et al.  2014; Lygre and Eid 2012;  Marone
2013; Silke 2015). 
Approval  for  suicide  terrorism  can  therefore  be
treated  as  an expression of  the  legitimization  of  ji-
hadist organizations and their ideologies (Kruglanski
et  al.  2014;  McGinley  2010;  Moghaddam  2005;
Zhirkov,  Verkuyten, and Weesie 2014).  It  is  believed
that justification and approval of terrorist acts plays
an elementary and significant part in the process of
radicalization (Kruglanski et al. 2014; McCauley 2012;
McGinley  2010;  Moghaddam  2005;  Zhirkov  et  al.,
2014), understood as a “movement in the direction of
supporting or enacting radical behavior” (Kruglanski
et al. 2014, 70). 
The aim of this study is to explore pro-terrorist atti-
tudes toward sacrifice and non-sacrifice terrorism sep-
arately. We expect that will contribute to a better un-
derstanding of the process of radicalization. Our fun-
damental question is about the psychological predis-
position to these forms of terrorism: do sacrifice and
non-sacrifice terrorism attract followers with the same
or different psychological characteristics? 
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2 The Role of Social and Personal Beliefs in 
Radicalization
There are many theoretical  models  of  radicalization
that include psychological factors among other possi-
ble determinants. In this article, we will focus on two
approaches to investigating the psychological risk fac-
tors: psychological profiling and the quest for signifi-
cance theory. The psychological profiling perspective
stems from classical psychology on individual recep-
tiveness  to  political  ideologies  (for  example  review
and discussion by Jakubowska 1999;  Jost 2009). This
approach mainly focuses on finding personality traits
that  are  unique  to  and  common  among  terrorists
(Hiebert and Dawson 2015). The effort to define a spe-
cial personality disposition to terrorism has thus far
been unsuccessful, leading to non-conclusive, contra-
dictory or unclear results (see for example the review
of  studies  on  the  “terrorist  personality”  by  Hiebert
and Dawson 2015). The failure of this approach may
be  connected  to  theoretical  assumptions  regarding
crucial  psychological  factors  (namely  personality
traits)  and/or  methodological  weaknesses  connected
to gathering anecdotal evidence from qualitative stud-
ies of small sample sizes (Lester, Young, and Lindsay
2004;  Lygre  and  Eid  2012;  Mintz  and  Brule  2009).
Thus, we propose the analysis of individual belief sys-
tems as indicators of predispositions towards terror-
ism.  This  seems  to be  an  effective  approach in the
process of preventing terrorism and de-radicalization
as in contrast to personality traits, which tend to be
constant,  an  individual’s  system  of  beliefs  can  be
modified. 
The quest  for  significance model  of  radicalization,
elaborated  by  Kruglanski  (2016),  identifies  universal
motivational  mechanisms  underlying  radicalization:
the feeling of loss of significance and the motivation
to restore it (see also Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015). This
model of radicalization avoids the weaknesses of the
psychological  profile  approach  and  is  well  docu-
mented both in qualitative and experimental studies,
so inspired our choice of individual beliefs which are
crucial for the process of radicalization. 
Our analysis of psychological predispositions to ter-
rorism will be conducted from the perspective of cog-
nitive psychology, which assumes that people respond
to the world as they perceive and interpret it. We will
focus on finding specific systems of beliefs as predic-
tors  of  pro-terrorist  attitudes.  These are beliefs  that
individuals hold about the nature of the social world
(interchangeably named ‘social beliefs’) and their own
lives (interchangeably named ‘personal beliefs’).  The
criteria for selecting beliefs that are crucial for radical-
ization are based on an assumption made by classical
studies of political preferences: that for an individual,
the attractiveness of an ideology is determined by its
consistency  with  their  specific  cognitive-affective
traits  (see  for  example  review  and  discussion  by
Jakubowska 1999; Jost 2009). 
As such, what are the core traits of jihadist ideol-
ogy? An analysis shows the following core traits: re-
ferring to religious argumentation; pointing out anti-
Muslim discrimination as a  reason for jihad;  simple
categorization of the social world into ‘us’ (Muslims)
and  enemies  (Western  democracies);  affirmation  of
strong hierarchized social relationships; and absolute
submission to authorities, both symbolic and personal
(Ellens 2007). Accordingly, we aimed to identify social
beliefs  that  are  coherent  with  jihadist  narratives.
These  are:  belief  about  discrimination  against  Mus-
lims, religious fundamentalism, an authoritarian un-
derstanding  of  social  relations,  and beliefs  that  the
world is hostile. 
Very little research has been devoted to the link be-
tween perceiving anti-Muslim discrimination and sup-
port for terrorism (Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015; Victoroff,
Adelman,  and  Matthews  2012).  It  observed  that  if
Muslims perceive themselves as victims of discrimina-
tion,  they  are  much  more  supportive  of  terrorism
(Achilov  and Shaykhutdinov 2013;  Saiya 2019;  Sirgy
2018, 2019). The enhancement of radicalization under
discrimination is explained by many theories (Horgan
2005; Schils and Verhage 2018; Sirgy 2019;  Victoroff,
Adelman, and Matthews 2012), including the quest for
significance theory. According to the latter, an individ-
ual’s experience of discrimination is one of the main
sources of loss of significance, which may be restored
by supporting terrorism or  engaging in terrorist  at-
tacks (Kruglanski 2016; Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglanski
2017; Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015). This model refers to
the “actor’s” perspective: to people who have experi-
enced religious, social, or political oppression or per-
ijcv.org
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ceive themselves as victims of such persecution (see
also Sirgy 2018, 2019).
However, we can postulate that observing discrimi-
natory behaviors or policies toward Muslims may also
evoke support for using terrorist violence in defense of
their human rights (Schils and Verhage 2018). In this
case,  the  mechanisms  justifying  violence  may  be
rooted in feelings of empathy and compassion for the
aggrieved people, as well as in anger against the per-
secutors. Thus, regardless of the perspective (actor or
observer)  beliefs  about  discrimination  against  Mus-
lims probably predict acceptance of terrorist violence
as  a  defense  against  oppression  and  injustice.  We
therefore  expect  to  find  stronger  belief  about  Muslim
discrimination to be associated with a stronger tendency
to accept terrorism (Hypothesis 1). 
Religiosity comes to the fore in studies on the psy-
chological  roots  of  the  radicalization process.  Much
existing research shows that religiosity in general, and
especially Islam, is the factor that plays the smallest
direct role in the process of radicalization (Abdulaga-
tov  2013;  Aly  and  Strieghen  2012;  Kassim  2008;
McGinley 2010; Rogers et al. 2007; Zhirkov, Verkuyten,
and Weesie 2014).  On the other  hand,  there  is  evi-
dence showing that Muslim believers are more likely
to approve of terrorism than the followers of other re-
ligions (Fair and Shepherd 2006; Levy 2019). Therefore,
the system of religious beliefs is used by terrorist ide-
ologists to legitimize war, and propaganda referring to
that system can be more easily accepted by religious
individuals  than  by  those  who  are  non-religious
(Kruglanski 2016; Levy 2019; Vergani and Bliuk 2016).
There are reasons to believe that although religiosity
may not per se be a crucial factor in the radicalization
process,  it  can  become  so  under  particular  circum-
stances. We can assume that fundamentalist religious
beliefs predispose individuals to the acceptance of ter-
rorism. In this case, religiosity is a central belief that
determines  individual  identity,  group  membership,
and lifestyle, and forms a basis for evaluation of the
outer  world  (Altemeyer  and Hunsberger  1992,  2004;
Rogers  et  al.  2007;  Tibi  1995;  Verkuyten  and  Yildiz
2010).  We can assume that  the stronger  the funda-
mentalism, the stronger the sense of injustice, anger,
and aggression in conditions of perceived discrimina-
tion  (especially  obstacles  to  realization  of  religious
practices), and the greater the susceptibility to the in-
fluence of terrorist ideologies.  Therefore, we expect to
find  that  stronger  religious  fundamentalism is  associ-
ated with increased support for terrorism, especially for
sacrifice terrorism as associated with religious references
in jihadist ideology (Hypothesis 2).
According to Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2005), the
dominant feature of fundamentalist religious beliefs is
an  authoritarian  understanding  of  social  relations.
This means an absolute obedience to different author-
ities, such as symbolic (religious) authorities and re-
spected figures and organizations. In an authoritarian
world there is no place for aspirations of win-win type
relations. There can only be the strong and the weak,
victors and defeated, winners and losers. Jihadist ide-
ology  can  easily  influence  authoritarian  people  not
only because of its similar cognitive method of world
construction, but also because of a specific affective
trait  of  authoritarianism:  generalized  hostility
(Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1996). Approval of ter-
rorist  violence  is  a  symbolic  opportunity  to  release
this  hostility  by  overtly  directing  it  towards  adver-
saries identified by the leaders of terrorist organiza-
tions. We propose that a high level of authoritarianism
is a facilitator of support for terrorism (Hypothesis 3).
Empirical  data show that  both  authoritarians  and
fundamentalists create a cognitively simple, dichoto-
mous  representation  of  the  world  (Edgington  1990;
Savage and Liht 2008). It is a Manichean world view
divides the world into “good”, equated with the com-
munity  of  coreligionists,  and “evil”  “others”,  encom-
passing all those who do not share the same system
of  religious  beliefs  (Jones  2006;  Moghaddam  2005;
Strozier 2009). Jihadist ideology portrays a hostile, di-
chotomous view of a world divided into Muslim be-
lievers  and  threatening  heathens  (Ellens  2007).  Ji-
hadist rhetoric describes the world as a hostile place
and politics – as an important part of that world – as
devoid of any worth,  disreputable,  and unworthy of
trust (Ellens 2007). A belief that the world is hostile
and unjust and that politicians are dishonorable can
result in the perception that violence is justified be-
cause it seems the only possible means of achieving
political goals under these circumstances.  We predict
that stronger acceptance of terrorism is associated with
a more intense belief in a hostile world (Hypothesis 4).
ijcv.org
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A separate category of beliefs deals with the lives of
the individual (personal beliefs). The model of radical-
ization developed by Kruglanski et al. (2014) provides
premises with which to determine the role of personal
beliefs in radicalization. Empirical evidence collected
to  verify  this  theory  suggests  that  susceptibility  to
terrorist ideologies depends on the significance of the
loss,  such as that expressed for example as a  belief
about one’s low level of success in life, loss of control
over one’s  life,  personal  trauma,  and negative emo-
tions  such  as  anxiety  and  shame  (see  also  Jasko,
LaFree, and Kruglanski 2017). We can define this com-
plex phenomenon as subjective evaluation of an indi-
vidual’s  quality  of  life,  which  may  be  measured
through the  general  evaluation  of  their  satisfaction
with life. It can therefore be presumed that a lower level
of general life satisfaction is associated with stronger ac-
ceptance of terrorism (Hypothesis 5). 
According to the  quest  for  significance theory,  an
important element influencing the evaluation of peo-
ple’s lives is the perceived quality of the social  net-
work to which they belong (Kruglanski  et  al.  2009).
Social networks can be both a source of support and
of suffering. Close interpersonal relationships discour-
age support for terrorism (Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglan-
ski 2017). On the other hand, a deficit of social sup-
port can lead to being easily influenced by terrorist
ideologies.  Terrorist  organizations,  because  of  their
impenetrability  and  close  emotional  relationships
based on trust, take the role of a substitute for family
and friends for many of  their  members.  They fulfill
the needs for acceptance, bonds, support, and close-
ness that could not be experienced before (Crenshaw
1986;  Kruglanski  et  al.  2009).  Therefore,  we presume
that the greater the deficit of social support, the stronger
the acceptance of terrorist attacks (Hypothesis 6). 
3 Method
3.1 Participants
The initial sample consisted of 536 participants, and
534  (294  females)  results  formed  the  final  analysis
sample. The sample (N = 534) consisted mainly of par-
ticipants with a secondary education (n = 326), with
fewer  declaring  higher  education  (n=147),  and  the
least declaring primary and vocational education (n =
52).  Nine respondents did not indicate their level of
education. Education data were gathered in six cate-
gories: primary (1), vocational (2), secondary (3), post-
secondary  (4),  college/university  without  degree  (5),
college/university with degree (6).  In the sample de-
scription above, we condensed categories (3) and (4)
into “secondary education” and categories (5) and (6)
as “higher education.”
Participants were recruited to the study according
to their religious affiliation:  Islam versus non-Islam/
non-believers.  266  participants  were  Muslims,  214
were  from  Christian  religions  (Catholic,  Orthodox,
Protestant), 11 people indicated “other” (for example
Hinduism, Judaism, Taoism), and 43 were “without re-
ligion.”  In  the  case  of  Muslims,  we  controlled  the
types of acculturation, arbitrarily distinguishing three
groups.  The  first  group  contained  Polish  Muslims,
mainly descendants of the Tatars whose ancestors mi-
grated to Poland approximately six centuries ago (ap-
prox. 0.4 to 0.6 percent of the Polish population). This
group  is  culturally  integrated  and  differs  from  the
Catholic Polish majority  only in its  religion (Islam).
The second group contained partially integrated par-
ticipants, consisting of foreign Muslim students. Their
integration with Polish society takes place mainly in
the academic community. The third group contained
culturally isolated groups of Muslim immigrants, who
had applied for refugee status and resided in the Cen-
ters  for  Foreigners.  For  every  Muslim  we  also  re-
cruited  believers  of  other  religions  or  non-believers
who were equivalent to in gender, age, and education.
This resulted in the creation of six subgroups:
A. Polish citizens: (1) Muslims (n = 121, 71 female)
and  (2)  non-Muslims  (n =  123,  74  female)  (χ2=.06,
df=1, p>.1). The mean age of subsample 1 was 47.4 (SD
= 19.3) with a range of 17 to 87, and subsample 2 was
46.6 (SD = 18.5) with a range of 16 to 81 (t=.31,  p>.1).
Subsample A was equivalent  in regard of education
(χ2 = 2.70, df=5, p>.1).
B. Foreign students: (3) Muslims (n = 62, 27 female)
and (4) non-Muslims (n = 60, 25 female) (χ2=.04, df=1,
p>.1). The mean age of subsample 3 was 22 (SD = 2.5)
with a range of 19-33, and subsample 4 was 22.7 (SD =
2.5) with a range of 18-29 (t=.62,  p>.1). Subsample B
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C. Immigrants: (5) Muslims (n = 83, 47 female) and
(6)  non-Muslims  (n =  85,  50  female)  (χ2=.08,  df=1,
p>.1). While the Muslims were mainly of Chechen ori-
gin, the non-Muslim subgroup consisted of Chechens
(n = 31), Russians and Georgians (n = 54 in sum). The
mean age of subsample 5 was 35.4 (SD = 10.3) with a
range of 18-66 and subsample 6 was 34.1 (SD = 7.7)
with a range of 23-63 (t=.95, p>.1). Muslim immigrants
were significantly less educated than non-Muslim im-
migrants (χ2=38.83, df=5, p<.01). 
3.2 Procedure
Studies among the religious Muslims were conducted
with the informed consent of the presidents of reli-
gious communities and the administrators of foreign
student  associations.  Data  were  collected  during
group events such as periodic meetings of foreign stu-
dents  and  religious  community  gatherings.  Immi-
grants  were  reached  in  the  Centers  for  Foreigners,
centers of Polish language learning, and cultural cen-
ters  that  center  around  immigrants.  Research  was
conducted in nine cities in different regions of Poland.
Participants  were  recruited  using  the  “snowball”
method, and participation was voluntary. The survey
was conducted by a group of trained pollsters. They
were psychologists  of  Polish,  Russian,  and Chechen
descent specializing in social  and cross-cultural psy-
chology. 
Participants  completed  their  set  of  questionnaires
unassisted at  home or in  small  groups during their
meetings with the pollsters. Measurements were con-
ducted in conditions  that  provided anonymity.  Poll-
sters  gathered  the  completed  questionnaires  into  a
pile,  and  some participants  mailed  their  completed
questionnaires  to  the  research  team  anonymously,
without a  return address.  Completing the question-
naire took between 25 minutes and one hour. 
The questionnaires had five language versions ad-
justed to the studied groups: English (applied mainly
in the foreign students’ subgroups), Arabic, Chechen,
Russian, and Polish. The other language versions were
translated from Polish by native speakers with higher
education who had been Polish citizens/residents for
at least a couple of years and who were fluent in Pol-
ish.
3.3 Variables and Measures 
3.3.1 Outcome variables
The variable of pro-terrorist attitude was measured by
two scales. One reflected acceptance of non-sacrifice
terrorism. The measure was titled “Citizens’  protest”
and provided the following instruction: 
“It is only natural in democratic countries that citizens are
dissatisfied with various decisions made by their govern-
ments. Listed below are several methods of protesting. We
are asking you now to define to what extent people are al-
lowed  to  undertake  such  actions  in  just  causes.  Please
circle  the point  of  the scale that  best  reflects  your own
opinion on this subject.” 
To camouflage the real purpose of the measurement,
nine different violent political acts were listed (for ex-
ample illegal strikes, blockades of roads and bridges),
including  the  three  terrorist  acts  relevant  to  the
present analysis: planting bombs (for example in cars,
buildings),  hostage-taking,  and killing  people.  A de-
briefing procedure was not necessary as the partici-
pants were not deceived.  Each item was rated on a
four-point scale from “definitely not” (1) to “definitely
yes” (4). The mean of the three terrorism items was
computed as  an indicator  of  acceptance of  terrorist
attacks.  The  greater  the  value  of  the  indicator,  the
greater the acceptance of terrorist attacks. Cronbach’s
alpha for the three analyzed items was .84. 
The second measure reflected acceptance of  sacri-
fice terrorism. The scale was titled: “How should one
fight for one’s country and religion”, and provided the
following instructions: 
“For centuries people have been sacrificing their lives to
defend their nation and religion. This method of fighting
has been recently discussed in the context of suicidal at-
tacks  by  people  of  Islamic  affiliation.  Listed  below  are
some of  the  more  commonly  expressed  statements  con-
cerning  this  problem.  What  is  your  opinion  of  these
people’s behavior? Please circle the number on the scale
that best reflects your opinion.”
The scale consisted of four items describing suicide
terrorist acts, including two reversed items. Each item
was rated on a four-point scale from “I strongly dis-
agree” (1) to “I strongly agree” (4). 
A  confirmatory  factor  analysis  conducted  to  test
whether the measurement is culturally equivalent in
all of the investigated sub-samples did not confirm an
equivalence when reversed items were used. The fit
indices in each tested group showed significant incon-
sistency  between  the  theoretically  assumed  one-di-
mensional model and the data. The obtained values of
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fit  parameters  were  significantly  lower  than  values
commonly adopted in structural modeling (cf. Hooper,
Coughlan,  and  Mullen  2008;  Hu  and  Bentler  1995;
Sivo et al. 2006). Moreover, the factorial structure ob-
served in the investigated sub-samples varied.  Thus,
we included only two positive statements on suicide
terrorism in our analysis:  “People  who sacrifice  their
lives for their nation and religion are heroes, and should
be  admired” and  “Under  certain  conditions  giving  up
one’s life is the only way to act”. The mean for these
two statements was computed as an indicator of ac-
ceptance of sacrifice terrorism. The greater the value
of  the  indicator,  the  greater  acceptance  of  sacrifice
terrorism.  Pearson’s  coefficient  for  these  two  items
was r=.40, p<.001 (N=520). 
3.3.2 Predictors 
Belief about Muslim discrimination. This variable was
indexed by an evaluation of opportunities for religious
practice. Participants were asked for their opinion re-
garding how good the conditions for the cultivation of
Islam,  Catholicism,  Judaism,  Protestantism,  and the
Eastern Orthodox Church are in Poland. These condi-
tions were evaluated by the degree of freedom to con-
struct places of worship and develop activity for sys-
tematic  expansion  of  their  circles  of  followers.  The
choice of such indexing was justified by observations
of many acts of vandalism toward Muslim cultural re-
ligious  centers,  and  protests  by  local  communities
against Muslim initiatives to found new mosques. In
Poland,  no  acts  of  institutionalized  discrimination
against the Muslim minority (such as socio-economic
discrimination  or  political  exclusion)  have  been  ob-
served according to generally accepted criteria (Choi
and Piazza 2016; Piazza 2012). Thus, these aspects of
discrimination were omitted from the study. In further
analyses, the participants’ responses to one item con-
cerning  discrimination  against  Muslim  for  religious
practice were taken into consideration. Opinions con-
cerning each religious practice were measured using a
scale from 1 (the worst conditions) to 10 (the best con-
ditions). 
Religious  fundamentalism. Measured  by  Altemeyer
and Hunsberger's scale (2004), adapted to Polish con-
ditions  by  Jakubowska  and  Oniszczenko  (2010).  An
abbreviated version of the original 20-item scale was
used. The scale includes such items as: “God has given
humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and
salvation, which must be totally followed”. Each item is
rated on an anchored scale from -4 (very strong dis-
agreement) to +4 (very strong agreement). The higher
the score, the stronger the religious fundamentalism.
The Religious Fundamentalism Scale is very reliable,
and alpha reliability in the present study was .91. 
Authoritarianism. The  scale  consisted  of  six  items
measuring uncritical respect for hierarchical social re-
lations and admiration for social dominance and au-
thority, and was modeled on the well-known Kohn’s
Scale (Kohn and Slomczynski 1990); for example “One
should always show respect  to people in power” (Ko-
rzeniowski 2006). Respondents were asked to indicate
their disagreement or agreement with the statements
on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = I strongly disagree to 4 = I
strongly agree). The reliability of the scale amounted
to an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha of .78.
Belief in a hostile world. This measure was used to
assess whether the participants  are inclined to per-
ceive people and the world as rather friendly or hos-
tile. For this purpose, we used a shortened version of
the World Assumption Scale by Janoff-Bulman (1989,
see also van Bruggen et al. 2018) in its Polish adapta-
tion by Kaniasty (2003). The first four items dealt with
assumptions about the benevolence of people (for ex-
ample “People are basically kind and helpful”). The re-
maining four items dealt with assumptions about the
benevolence  of  the  impersonal  world  (for  example
“There is more good than evil in the world”). Each item
is  rated  on  a  scale  from 1  (strongly  disagree)  to  4
(strongly agree). Low scores indicate a belief that the
world is rather hostile, high scores that it tends to be
friendly. The reliability of the score on this instrument
in the present study was acceptable (Cronbach’s al-
pha .73). 
Life satisfaction. Cantril’s (1965) Ladder of Life Scale
was used, where participants were asked how (in gen-
eral terms) they perceive their life. They marked their
responses using a 10-point scale, where 1 signified the
worst and 10 the best life.
Perceived social support. This variable was measured
by  five  items  assessing  perceived  emotional  social
support drawn from the Perceived Social Support Scale
adapted by Kaniasty (2003), for example “I have a per-
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son  with  whom  I  can  share  my  deepest  worries  and
fears”,  “Relationships with my family and friends give
me a sense of peace and security.” Participants evalu-
ated the perceived availability of  emotional  support
on a four-point  scale  (1=definitely  false,  2=probably
false, 3=probably true,  4=definitely true).  The higher
the score, the greater the availability of social support.
Cronbach’s alpha was good, at .81.
Religion  and  socio-demographic  variables. Partici-
pants were asked to give their gender, age, education,
and religious  affiliation  (Christian:  Roman Catholic,
Eastern  Orthodox,  Protestant;  Islamic;  Jewish;
Other…), or to indicate no religious affiliation. 
4 Results
In  the  first  step  we  examined the  relationships  be-
tween all measurements used in the study (see Table
1). 
As Table 1 shows, the two measurements of pro-ter-
rorist  attitudes  were  significantly,  but  weakly  (posi-
tively) correlated (r=.22, p<.01). The highest value of
Pearson’s coefficient (r=.38, p<.01) was observed in the
relationship  between  religious  fundamentalism  and
authoritarianism,  and the relationship  between per-
ceived  social  support  and  life  satisfaction  (r=.31,
p<.01). 
In  order  to  test  our  hypotheses,  we  conducted  a
three-step hierarchical regression on pro-terrorist atti-
tudes, separately on acceptance of non-sacrifice ter-
rorism and on acceptance of sacrifice terrorism (see
Table 2). 
As Table 2 shows, three models that explain pro-ter-
rorist  attitudes  were  analyzed.  Models  1  and  2  in-
cluded control variables. Model 1 involved sociodemo-
graphic  variables:  gender,  education,  and  age.  In
Model 2, the variable of Islam or non-Islam affiliation
(described  as  affiliation  to  Muslim  or  non-Muslim
sub-samples) was added. Model 3 included the same
set of control variables, and in addition social and per-
sonal beliefs. This model was best in predicting both
acceptance of  non-sacrifice  terrorist  attacks  and ac-
ceptance of  sacrifice terrorism.  Model  3  shows that
pro-terrorist attitudes (acceptance of non-sacrifice and
acceptance  of  sacrifice  terrorism)  are  predicted  by
separate patterns of psychological predictors (see Ta-
ble 2). 
The results were broadly consistent with our predic-
tions,  with  the  exception  of  Hypothesis  5.  We  ob-
served a marginally significant influence (p<.1) of be-
lief about Muslim discrimination on the acceptance of
sacrifice  terrorism  (Hypothesis  1).  Religious  funda-
mentalism (beta=.28, p<.01; Hypothesis 2) and author-
itarianism (beta=.13, p<.01; Hypothesis 3) were signifi-
cant  predictors  of  acceptance  of  sacrifice  terrorism.
The strongest psychological predictors of acceptance
of non-sacrifice terrorist attacks were belief in a hos-
tile  world  (beta=.13,  p<.01;  Hypothesis  4)  and  per-
ceived lower social support (beta=-.17, p<.01; Hypoth-
esis 6). It is worth noting that perceived lower social
support  showed  a  marginally  significant  influence
(p<.1; see: Table 2) on the prediction of acceptance of
sacrifice terrorism. We did not confirm Hypothesis 5,
which assumed a connection between lower life satis-
faction and pro-terrorist attitudes. However, an analy-
sis  of  inter-correlations  between  the  analyzed  vari-
ables  shows  that  life  satisfaction  was  significantly
correlated with other beliefs that had a much stronger
influence on pro-terrorist attitudes (see Table 1). 
Among the analyzed control variables, gender and
age were strong predictors of both acceptance of non-
sacrifice terrorist attacks and of sacrifice terrorism in
each  of  the  three  models.  Younger  men  declared
greater acceptance of both non-sacrifice and sacrifice
terrorism (see Models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2). Religiosity
(Muslim or non-Muslim) showed a significant influ-
ence on the acceptance of sacrifice terrorism in Model
2  of  the  hierarchical  regression  analysis  (beta=.22,
p<.01; see Table 2). The influence of this variable be-
came weak and statistically non-significant when so-
cial  and  personal  beliefs  were  entered  in  Model  3
(beta =.06, p>.1; see Table 2). 
The role of Muslim affiliation on pro-terrorist atti-
tudes in Model 2 led us to conduct a more detailed
analysis to examine whether the observed influence is
an effect  of  religiosity  or rather  a  contextual  factor
that  reflects  cultural  integration,  partial  integration,
or socio-cultural isolation. Table 3 shows the result of
comparisons of sub-sample pairs that were equivalent
in terms of gender, age, and education. The only ex-
ception was Muslim immigrants; this group was less
educated than the equivalent immigrant sub-sample. 
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Table 2: Standardized betas from hierarchical regression on pro-terrorist attitudes
Acceptance of non-sacrifice terrorism Acceptance of sacrifice terrorism
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Gender .18** .18** .17** .13** .13** .13**
Education -.04 -.04 -.03 -.14** -.12** -.02
Age -.21** -.21** -.18** -.29** -.29** -.28**
Muslims/non-Muslims .06 .07 .22** .06
Belief about Muslim discrimination -.04 -.07^
Religious fundamentalism -.04 .28**
Authoritarianism -.01 .13**
Belief in a hostile world .13** .01
Life satisfaction .05 -.04
Perceived social support -.17** -.08^
R2 change .003 .046 .05 .11
R2 .07 .07 .11 .11 .16 .26
Note: Gender is coded as 1=female, 2=male, affiliation to Muslim or non-Muslim sub-samples is coded as 1=non-
Muslims, 2=Muslims.**p<.01, ^p<.1
Table 1: Intercorrelation matrix of all measures used in the analysis
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Gender (1)
Education (2) .04
Age (3) -.08 -.14**
Acceptance of non-sacrifice terrorism (4) .17** -.05 -.23**
Acceptance of sacrifice terrorism (5) .15** -.11* -.27** .22**
Belief about Muslim discrimination (6) .03 -.06 .14** -.06 -.10*
Religious Fundamentalism (7) -.06 -.26** .01 .03 .38** .02
Authoritarianism (8) .05 -.34** .02 .06 .31** .06 .41**
Belief in a hostile world (9) -.07 -.08 -.07 .12** .10* -.05 .07 .15
Life satisfaction (10) -.01 .16** -.09* -.07 -.14** .09* -.16** -.25** -.31**
Perceived social support (11) -.09* .09* .01 -.17** -.16** .04 -.11** -.15** -.19** .38**
Note: gender is coded as 1=female, 2=male.**p<.01,  *p<.05
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As Table 3 shows, in all subsamples the mean scores
on acceptance of non-sacrifice terrorism are very low,
ranging between 1.09 in the group of non-Muslim im-
migrants  and  1.60  among  Muslim  foreign  students.
The only statistically significant inter-group difference
was observed between Muslim immigrants (M=1.26)
and non-Muslim immigrants (M=1.09;  t=2.26,  p<.05),
with significant effect  size (Cohen’s d = .70)  (Cum-
ming and Calin-Jageman 2017;  Schäfer and Schwarz
2019). 
Stronger endorsement of pro-terrorist attitudes was
observed with regard to acceptance of sacrifice terror-
ism.  The  mean  scores  ranged  between  1.66  (Polish
Muslims) and 2.90 (Muslim immigrants). The compar-
ison of  sub-samples found no significant differences
between native Muslim and non-Muslim participants
(t=.40, p>.1). Statistically significant differences were
observed  among  foreign  participants  (both  student
and immigrant subsamples). Muslim foreign students
accepted more sacrifice terrorism (M=2.57) than non-
Muslim  foreign  students  (M=2.08;  t=3.24,  p<.01),  as
well as Muslim immigrants who accepted more sacri-
fice terrorism (M=2.90) when compared to non-Mus-
lim  immigrants  (M=2.00;  t=8.05,  p<.01).  The  effect
sizes were medium (Cohen’s d = .59) and large (Co-
hen’s  d  =  1.25),  respectively  (Cumming  and  Calin-
Jageman 2017; Schäfer and Schwarz 2019).
5 Discussion 
In  discussing  our  results,  some  limitations  of  this
study should be considered. One is the correlational
design of the measurements, which make our conclu-
sions about the cause-effect relationship hypothetical.
Keeping this reservation in mind, we can say the re-
sults of our statistical analyses confirmed the theoret-
ical assumption described in the literature about two
distinct forms of pro-terrorist attitudes, namely accep-
tance  of  non-sacrifice  terrorism  and  acceptance  of
sacrifice terrorism (Marone 2013).  We observed that
two indicators of pro-terrorist attitudes – support for
non-sacrifice terrorist acts and acceptance of sacrifice
terrorism – displayed a low positive correlation (see
Table 1). The significant but low value of the correla-
tion  coefficient  between attitudes  toward non-sacri-
fice and sacrifice terrorism (see Table 1) suggests that
they are separated from each other, but also overlap-
ping to some extent. This is not surprising when con-
sidering that both forms of terrorism express support
for political violence. 
We found that both forms of pro-terrorist attitudes
are predicted by separate configurations of psycholog-
ical factors (see Table 2).  It  is worth noting the dy-
namics  of  the  results  of  our  hierarchical  regression
analyses, and the substantial role of one group of pre-
dictors, namely social and personal beliefs. The pre-
dominant role of these predictors was evident in the
reported regression equations calculated for both ac-
ceptance  of  non-sacrifice  and  sacrifice  terrorist  at-
tacks (see Table 2). In Step 1 of the analyses, the role
of social and demographic factors turned out to be ex-
plicit  and moderately strong.  They explained 7 per-
cent of acceptance of non-sacrifice terrorism and 11
percent  of  acceptance  of  sacrifice  terrorist  attacks.
After entering the “being a Muslim” variable into the
regression equation in Step 2, the incremental R2 was
less than marginal for acceptance of non-sacrifice ter-
ijcv.org
Table 3: Differences between investigated sub-samples in pro-terrorist attitudes
Acceptance of non-sacrifice terrorism Acceptance of sacrifice terrorism
Sub-samples Mean SD t Cohen’s d Mean SD t Cohen’s d
A. Polish Muslims 1.14 .42 1.66 .74
Polish non-Muslims 1.15 .46 -.33 .02 1.62 .55 .40 .06
B. Muslim foreign students 1.60 .73 2.57 .90
Non-Muslim foreign students 1.53 .79 .52 .09 2.08 .75 3.24** .59
C. Muslim immigrants 1.26 .54 2.90 .70
Non-Muslim immigrants 1.09 .43 2.26* .70 2.00 .74 8.05** 1.25
Note: A= Integrated Muslims, B=Partly integrated Muslims; C=Isolated Muslims. **p<.01; *p<.05.
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rorism (.003) and low for acceptance of sacrifice ter-
rorism (.05). It may be worth adding that in the last
case the “being a Muslim” variable in Step 3 lost its
significance  when  social  and  personal  beliefs  were
taken  into  consideration.  After  entering  social  and
personal beliefs in Step 3, we observed a relatively dis-
tinctive increase in explained variance in both cases.
Incremental R2 for acceptance of non-sacrifice was .05,
and for  acceptance  of  sacrifice  terrorist  attacks  .11.
One must bear in mind, however, that different con-
figurations of beliefs transpired to be crucial for the
acceptance of both forms of terrorism. These are be-
liefs  in  a  hostile  world and lack of  perceived social
support in the case of non-sacrifice terrorism, and re-
ligious  fundamentalism and authoritarianism in the
case of sacrifice terrorism. The latter result may sug-
gest the importance of religious fundamentalism over
religious affiliation in determining acceptance of sac-
rifice terrorism. 
The regression analysis revealed what is presumably
the influence of the strongest predictor among the set
of intercorrelated variables (see Table 1).  Keeping in
mind these limitations, we can draw some conclusions
about the psychological beliefs that predispose indi-
viduals to sacrifice and non-sacrifice terrorism. Accep-
tance of non-sacrifice terrorism was significantly pre-
dicted by belief in a hostile world and perceived lower
social support, whereas acceptance of sacrifice terror-
ism  was  significantly  predicted  by  religious  funda-
mentalism  and  authoritarianism (see  Table  2).  It  is
worth emphasizing that this separate configuration of
predictors for non-sacrifice and sacrifice terrorist at-
tacks  suggests  separate  psychological  mechanisms
underlying  pro-terrorist  attitudes.  Whereas  accep-
tance  of  sacrifice  terrorism  seems  to  be  motivated
mainly religiously with strong submission to author-
ity, acceptance of non-sacrifice terrorist attacks is re-
lated to deep frustration manifested as belief in a hos-
tile  world  and feelings  of  loneliness.  Thus,  we con-
clude that  the psychological  functions  of  these two
types of pro-terrorist attitudes may be different. Ac-
ceptance of sacrifice terrorism serves rather as a de-
fense of religion and culture of a strongly hierarchized
society,  while  support  for  non-sacrifice  terrorism
probably  serves  to release personal  frustration.  This
distinction adds to the existing literature on radical-
ization.  Knowing  about  the  different  psychological
functions of different forms of acceptance of terrorism
may be  important  in  planning prevention  programs
against  radicalization.  These  psychological  actions
should be directed to the separate motives and beliefs
of individuals. 
Each of the pro-terrorist attitudes were predicted by
the  same  demographic  factors,  gender  and  age.
Younger men showed a stronger acceptance of both
non-sacrifice terrorist acts and sacrifice terrorism (see
Table 2). Thus, in our sample younger men appeared
more susceptible to terrorism. Our findings are consis-
tent with data from many countries (Ley 2019; Tuh-
vatullin,  Epshteyn,  and  Imamutdinova  2018).  How-
ever, this observation is not universal. Some findings
show  no  statistical  differences  between  men  and
women in support for terrorism (Zhirkov et al. 2014),
and others  suggest  that  females  are  more  likely  to
support terrorism (Fair and Shepherd 2006). 
The results of the comparison between Muslim and
non-Muslim groups in regard of their support for ter-
rorism suggest that Islam per se is not a significant
factor in the radicalization process.  We observed no
statistically significant differences between culturally
integrated native Muslims and non-Muslim Poles re-
garding both indications of radicalization in contrast
to  the  other  investigated  groups  (see  Table  3).  An
analysis of the socio-contextual factors of pro-terrorist
attitudes  showed  that  the  risk  of  radicalization  in-
creases with a higher degree of socio-cultural isola-
tion. We found the strongest pro-terrorist attitudes for
both indicators of radicalization in Muslims who were
socially isolated from the autochthonous population,
and  weaker  acceptance  of  terrorism  was  observed
among Muslims who were culturally integrated to a
certain extent (students) (see Table 3). The limitations
of our study are connected with the properties and
composition of the most radicalized sample. Unfortu-
nately, it was consisted mainly of Chechens, and in
future studies it would be worth extending the com-
position to representatives of other Muslim nations. 
The most  radicalized group in our study was war
refugees,  who  lived  in  socially  isolated  Centers  for
Foreigners where they were waiting for official deci-
sions on their immigration status. This entails living
under insecure conditions, defined in this case by an
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unknown period of waiting for an uncertain decision
that would determine their future. These two contex-
tual factors may explain the higher rate of radicaliza-
tion among the socially isolated group. One of them is
living under insecure life conditions, and the second
relates to a socio-cultural isolation. Further analyses
are necessary to find which of these contextual fac-
tors  are crucial  in  the process  of  radicalization.  Ac-
cording to the findings of Ozer and Bertelsen (2019),
insecure sociocultural embeddedness can be a crucial
factor for initiating the process of radicalization. Thus,
the protection of secure life conditions may be an ef-
fective instrument of prevention against terrorist in-
fluence. Other data indicate that individuals in cultur-
ally isolated hermetic groups are more sensitive to the
impact of in-group norms and in-group leaders than
those in heterogeneous groups, where there are many
opportunities to confront in-group norms and values
with out-group ones (Koomen and Pligt 2016). 
The results of our study, which demonstrate the im-
portant role of cultural isolation are in line with the
observations of radicalized Muslims born, raised, and
educated in Western democratic countries. Many im-
migrants,  despite being of  the second or even third
generation,  often  live  in  their  own,  culturally  sepa-
rated enclaves (Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015). Such condi-
tions probably favor forming a system of beliefs that –
as we expected – predisposes towards the acceptance
of sacrifice terrorism. Thus, our results encourage to
revise immigration policy toward cultural integration
of Muslim immigrants with autochthonous non-Mus-
lim communities. 
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